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CORPORATIONS-SECURITIES :REGULATION-PARENT CORPORATION AS INSIDER
REALIZING SHORTSWING PROFIT-Parent corporation, owning a majority of
the outstanding voting securities of its subsidiary, sold 120,000 shares of
the subsidiary's common stock. A substantial shortswing profit was realized
on 4115 shares which had been purchased on the open market five months
earlier.1 The sale, whereby the parent was to divest itself of control of its
subsidiary, was made pursuant to an agreement between both companies
and approved by a majority of the voting stock of each. Section 16 (b) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 19342 provides that officers, directors and
beneficial owners of more than ten percent of any class of equity securities
shall be liable to the issuing corporation for any profit realized from the
sale of its securities held for less than six months. Plaintiff brought a shareholder derivative action on behalf of the subsidiary against the parent under section 16 (b). On appeal from a judgment in favor of plaintiff, held,
affirmed. The agreement between parent and subsidiary which induced
the sale does not prevent recovery for the benefit of the subsidiary under
section 16 (b). The clear language and purpose of the statute precludes an
estoppel based upon instigation by or benefit to the subsidiary. Magida
v. Continental Gan Company, (2d Cir. 1956) 231 F. (2d) 843.
At common law the majority rule is that no fiduciary duty exists between
a director or officer and the individual shareholder of a corporation with
respect to the stock of the corporation.3 Thus, a director or officer is under
no legal compulsion to disclose any "inside" information to individual
shareholders when dealing in equity securities of a corporation. 4 Section
16 (b) was designed to minimize the use of inside information by persons
who stand in such relation to the corporation that they are likely to have
access to special information.5 The difficulties inherent in proving the
actual use of inside information 6 and the impossible task in most cases

1 In May 1950 the parent owned approximately 51.9% of the subsidiary's outstanding
preferred stock and approximately 59.2% of its common stock. The parent sold all the
preferred stock to the subsidiary. The sale of 120,000 shares of common stock reduced
the parent's holding to about 20% of the entire issue of common stock.
2 48 Stat. 896 (1934), 15 U.S.C. (1952) §78p (b).
s Walsh v. Goulden, 130 Mich. 531, 90 N.W. 406 (1902); Carpenter v. Danforth, 52
Barb. (N.Y.) 581 (1868); Seitz v. Frey, 152 Minn. 170, 188 N.W. 266 (1922). Contra,
Oliver v. Oliver, 118 Ga. 362, 45 S.E. 232 (1903). See generally 84 A.L.R. 615 (1933).
4 Legal writers are vigorously opposed to the rule. For an extensive compilation of
articles see Yourd, "Trading in Securities by Directors, Officers and Stockholders: Section
16 of the Securities Exchange Act," 38 MICH. L. REv. 133, n. 31 (1939).
5 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Obear-Nester Glass Co., (7th Cir. 1955) 217
F. (2d) 56, cert. den. 348 U.S. 982 (1955), reh. den. 349 U.S. 948 (1955); Truncale v.
Blumberg, (S.D. N.Y. 1948) 80 F. Supp. 387; Stella v. Graham-Paige Motors Corp.,
(S.D. N.Y. 1952) 104 F. Supp. 957.
o See the testimony of Thomas G. Corcoran, chief spokesman for the draftsmen of
the act in S. Hearings before the Committee on Banking and Currency on S. Res. 84,
72d Cong., 2d sess., and S. Res. 56, S. Res. 97, 73d Cong., 1st and 2d sess., p. 6557 (1934).
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of ascertaining who actually suffered the loss, led the framers of section
16 (b) to provide absolute liability to the company for all shortswing profits
irrespective of the intent of the insider.7 In the principal case~ these absolute rules combine to produce some outward inequities and perhaps demonstrate some real limitations. The primary contention of the parent was
that it would be inequitable to allow a suit on behalf of the subsidiary in
view of the fact that the subsidiary had instigated the plan of sale and had
materially benefited from its operation. The rejection of this defense
appears to be justified in light of the objective sought to be accomplished
by the statute. Section 16 (b) was not designed to compensate the issuer
corporation. Recovery by the issuer is provided only as a practical expedient. 8 The sole objective of the statute is to remove the incentive to make
shortswing profits by removing the profits. 9 _ Therefore, the fact that the
shortswing sale produces a benefit to the issuer or its shareholders is immaterial.10 Furthermore, rejection of the estoppel doctrine seems justified
since in most instances the parent-insider can dictate the policies of the
subsidiary and, in all cases, can provide majority shareholder approval of
any plan or policy decision. Although it may be argued that section 16 (b)
was not designed to deter shortswing sales by a parent of its subsidiary's
securities, the clear language and purpose of section 16 (b) admit no such
exception. It may be questioned, however, whether or not the primary
objective of the st'atute to provide a strong deterrent to the use of inside
information is realized in the parent-insider situation. The recovery by
the subsidiary will necessarily be reflected in an increase in the value of the
equitable interest of the parent, and although this is undoubtedly not as
desirable as a cash profit it is perhaps more appealing than not using inside
information to any advantage whatsoever.11 When, as in the principal case
the shortswing transaction itself operates to reduce the insider's equitable
interest to relatively low levels, the full impact of the statute is felt, but as a
1 Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., (S.D.N.Y. 1942) 46 F. Supp. 758, affd. (2d Cir. 1943)
136 F. (2d) 231, cert. den. 320 U.S 751 (1943); Gratz v. Claughton, (2d Cir. 1951) 187
F. (2d) 46, cert. den. 341 U.S. 920 (1951).
8 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Obear-Nester Glass Co., note 5 supra.
9 Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., note 7 supra; Commissioner of Internal Revenue ·v.
Obear-Nester Glass Co., note 5 supra. The original bill provided for criminal sanctions
in addition to the civil recovery. See testimony of Thomas G. Corcoran in S. Hearings
before the Committee on Banking and Currency on S. Res. 84, 72d Cong., 2d sess., and
S. Res. 56 and S. Res. 97, 73d Cong., 1st and 2d sess., pp. 6556, 6557 (1934).
10 In this regard, §29 (a) of the act, 48 Stat. 903 (1934), 15 U.S.C. (1952) §78cc (a)
provides: "Any condition, stipulation or provision binding any person to waive compliance with any provision of this title or of any rule or regulation thereunder . . . shall
be void." This section would seem to eliminate a defense based on estoppel. Cf. Jefferson Lake Sulphur Co. v. Walet, (E.D. La. 1952) 104 F. Supp. 20, affd. (5th Cir. 1953) 202
F. (2d) 433, cert. den. 346 U.S. 820 (1953); Park & Tilford v. Schulte, (2d Cir. 1947) 160
F. (2d) 984, cert. den. 332 U.S. 761 (1947). Cf. Consolidated Engineering Corp. v. Nesbit,
(S.D. Cal. 1951) 102 F. Supp. 112.
11 This limitation on the deterrent effect of the statute is present even at low
percentages of insider ownership, but the greater the equitable interest, the less will be
the real loss sustained by the insider by virtue of the profit recovery accruing to the issuer.
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general proposition large holders of equity securities who remain so after
a shortswing profit have relatively little to lose by operation of the
statute. The existence of this limitation is, of course, not a justification for
allowing the parent-insider to retain shortswing profits, thereby eliminating
all deterrent effect, but it is perhaps indicative of a need for revision in the
recovery feature of the statute.
Allan L. Bio[!

